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CASE COMMENTS
compensable under the workmen's compensation statutes by either of
two methods: first, by amending the acts to include such disabilities
specifically, as the court in the principal case impliedly recommended;
and secondly, by judicially construing the present statutes to cover
such disabilities, as the court in Chernin declined to do. It is sub-
mitted that the latter method is more appropriate. If the Texas Su-
preme Court could reach such a result under a "violence to the physi-
cal structure of the body" statute, surely a New York court could reach
a similar result under a less restrictive statute.
NICHOLAs H. RODRIGUEZ
REVOCATION OF ADOPTION AGREEMENTS
Adoption is a statutory right unknown to the common law,' and
it is universally held that the consent of the child's natural mother
to the adoption is a prerequisite to the vesting of this statutory right.
2
When a natural mother gives her written consent to the adoption of
her illegitimate child, and then, before a final decree of adoption,
attempts to withdraw her consent, a question arises resulting in con-
flict among courts of different jurisdictions, as well as between courts
of the same jurisdiction.
This problem was clearly presented in the Georgia case of Hen-
drix v. Hunter.3 The mother of a child born out of wedlock had
entered into a written contract with the adoptive parents, whereby she
consented to their adoption of the child. As consideration for the
contract the adoptive parents were to pay the mother's medical and
hospital expenses for prenatal care and delivery. Shortly after the
birth of the child the mother executed a second written consent to
the adoption, and subsequently the adoptive parents, having had
custody of the child for six months, filed a petition for adoption. At
the interlocutory hearing the mother filed objections to the adoption.
The court used a threefold basis in refusing to allow the natural
mother to revoke her written consent:(i) it would better serve the
interests of the child to allow the adoption petition; (2) the evidence
was not sufficient to allow a withdrawal of consent under the 1957
amendment to the Georgia adoption law;4 and (3) the contract was not
Madden, Persons and Domestic Relations § io6, at 354 (1931).
2Annot., 138 A.L.R. 1038 (1942).
399 Ga. App. 785, 110 S.E.2d 35 (1959).
"'[N]o adoption shall be permitted except with the written consent -of the
living parents of a child. Said consent when given freely, voluntarily, may not be
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void as violating public policy since the "benefits [accruing to the
mother] were secondary, indirect and incidental to the prenatal care
of the then unborn child."5 The dissenting opinion asserted that the
consideration, tantamount to a barter and sale of a child, violated
public policy and vitiated the contract,6 and further that the mother
should be able to withdraw her consent at the interlocutory hearing
without the court even considering the welfare of the child.7
There are three views relating to this problem. The traditional
majority view is that the natural parents may revoke consent at any
revoked by the parents as a matter of right." Ga. Laws 1957, No. 313 § 3, at 367. As
stated in the caption of the act, the purpose was to restrict the parents right to with-
draw consent.
511o S.E.2d at 38.
Olt seems undisputed that a child is not subject to barter and sale. In the case of
In re Adoption of Anonymous, 286 App. Div. 161, 143 N.Y.S.2d 90 (2d Dep't 1955),
in which the natural mother sought to extort money from the adoptive parents by
threatening to withdraw her consent, the court said, "[I]f she attempts to sell her
rights, or to dispose of her child to another for her own financial profit ... the ques-
tion presented is one of public policy in the administration of the law. She may
place her child with others for adoption, but she 'may neither demand nor accept
any compensation therefor except for reasonable medical fees and hospital charges
connected with her confinement." Id. at 94. See People ex rel. Gill v. Lapidus, 202
Misc. s116, i2o N.Y.S.2d 766 (Sup. Ct. 1953). Thus it would seem that accepting
reasonable medical expenses does not constitute a barter and sale. This is supported
by Barwin v. Riedy, 62 N.M. 183, 307 P.2d 175 (1957), in which the agreement con-
sisted of paying the mother $400 cash for medical expenses. The money was paid
directly to the mother. The New Mexico Supreme Court, in holding that this did
not violate public policy, said, "It is commonly the case that persons wishing to
adopt a child will make provision with its mother, or mother and father, before the
birth of the child, to pay hospital and medical expenses in connection with the care of
the mother and child. There is nothing in this practice inimical to public policy." Id.
at 184. The court went on to say that it would have been better to pay the doctor and
hospital directly, but that paying the parents, if done in good faith, constituted no
wrong. Ibid. In the principal case there is no evidence to the contrary that the
adoptive parents paid the expenses directly to the creditors. For other cases allowing
such expenses to be paid by the adoptive parents see In re Adoption of a Minor,
144 F.2d 644 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Bailey v. Mars, 138 Conn. 593, 87 A.2d 388 (1952); Lee
v. Thomas, 297 Ky. 858, 181 S.W.2d 457 (1944); In re Adoption of Morrison, 260 Wis.
50, 49 N.W.ad 759 (195)-
Generally, the type of consideration that does vitiate the contract is that which
runs directly to the mother, or parents, for their pecuniary benefit. Willey v.
Lawton, 8 Il. App. 2d 344, 132 N.E.2d 34 (1956). However, if the consideration moves
to the child there seems to be no problem. Savannah Bank & Trust Co. v. Wolff, igi
Ga. si , 5' S.E.2d 766 (1940).
7The case of Combs v. Edmiston, 216 Ark. 270, 225 S.W.2d 26 (1949) would seem
to support the dissent in Hendrix in that the court held that at the interlocutory
hearing the various views on withdrawal of consent were not yet applicable. In
Combs, however, it would seem that the decision rested primarily on the fact that
consent had not been freely and voluntarily given. That consent was freely and vol-
tarily given was undisputed in the principal case. Hendrix v. Hunter, 110 S.E.2d at 42.
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time prior to the final adoption decree.8 The jurisdictions following
this theory generally consider such revocation to be a matter of right.9
A good example of the reasoning used is to be found in the case of
In re Adoption of Schult,10 in which it was held "that where the law
provides that parental consent is an essential prerequisite in adop-
tion, it means the intelligent, deliberate and voluntary consent of
the parent,... and such consent must continue up until the actual
judicial approval of the adoption. Any change of mind by the parent,
in the interim, must be resolved in favor of the parent.""
The strict minority rule allows revocation only if some legal
cause is shown,12 such as fraud or duress in the initial procurement
of the consent.13 This rule is based on the view that once consent
has been freely and voluntarily given, the interest of society is better
served by denying revocation in the absence of legal cause.' 4 In re
Adoption of a Minor,15 quoted at length in the principal case due to
the similarity in facts, is illustrative of the minority rule. In construing
the District of Columbia adoption statute,'8 the court held that con-
"In re White's Adoption, 3oo Mich. 378, 1 N.W.2d 579 (1942); In re Anderson,
189 Minn. 85, 218 N.W. 657 (1933); State ex rel. Platzer v. Beardsley, 149 Minn. 435,
183 N.V. 956 (1921); In re Nelms, 153 Wash. 242, 279 Pac. 748 (1929). It should be
noted that there are still recent cases upholding the majority view. Wheeler v. How-
ard, 2t1 Ga. 596, 87 S.E.2d 377 (1955); Keheley v. Koonce, 85 Ga. App. 893, 70 S.E.2d
522 (1952); In re Thompson's Adoption, 178 Kan. 127, 283 P.2d 493 (1955); In re Byrd,
226 La. 194, 75 So. 2d 331 (1954); In re Bilyeu's Adoption, 210 Ore. 266, 310 P.2d
305 (1957).
"Wheeler v. Howard, 211 Ga. 596, 87 S.E.2d 377 (1955); In re Thompson's Adop-
tion, 178 Kan. 127, 283 P.2d 493 (1955). In at least one case, howeyer, the court noted
that "vested rights" might intervene. "It, is our opinion that under the circumstances
of this case, no vested rights having intervened (such as the adoptive parents having
had custody of the child for a substantial length of time), the natural mother had
the right to withdraw her consent to the adoption during the go days while the
probate court still had control over the matter by a rehearing. In re White's
Adoption, 3oo Mich. 378, 1 N.W.2d 579, 581 (1942).
1014 NJ. Super. 587, 82 A.2d 491 (Hudson County Ct. 1950-
"Id. at 493. "The same privilege of withdrawing consent to the adoption, prior
to the final order, should be accorded to the natural parents as the petitioners have
through their right to control the litigation." Keheley v. Koonce, 85 Ga. App. 893,
70 S.E.2d 522, 527 (1952).
"'In re Adoption of a Minor, 144 F.2d 64.1 (D.C. Cir. 1944); In re Adoption of a
Minor Child, 127 F. Supp. 256 (D.D.C. 1954); Ex parte Barents, 99 Cal. App. 2d 748,
222 P.2d 488 (195o); Sessions v. Oliver, 204 Ga. 425, 5o S.E.2d 54 (1948); In re Simaner's
Petition, 16 Ill. App. 2d 48, 147 N.E.2d 419 (1957); In re Adoption of Cannon, 243
Iowa 828, 53 N.W.2d 877 (1952); Wyness v. Crowley, 292 Mass. 461, 198 N.E. 758
(1935). See Annot., 156 A.L.R. 1o 1 (1945).
'3Lee V. Thomas, 297 Ky. 858, 181 S.W.2d 457 (1944)-
"'In re Adoption of a Minor, 144 F.2d 644 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Wyness v. Crowley,
292 Mass. 461, 198 N.E. 758 (1935).
2144 F.2d 644 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
"D.C. Code Ann. § 16-201-03 (1951).
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sent, freely and voluntarily given, could not be withdrawn as a matter
of right. In restricting revocation to legal cause shown, the court relied
heavily on public policy considerations. "The illegitimate child is
the visible evidence of transgression against religious and moral
standards,"'17 and as a result of this the child is subjected to various
pressures and ridicule from the dominant group of society. Because of
this problem and a resulting desire to place such children in respon-
sible homes, the court held that to permit the mother to revoke consent
at her own discretion, after having set the adoption in motion by
granting consent, would defeat any possible remedial action that
might be taken by various organized groups endeavoring to better the
position of such illegitimate children.' 8 This is not to say, however,
that illegitimate children are to be taken from their natural parents
solely because the adoptive parents can give them certain superior
advantages. 19 The right of the natural parent to his or her child
is not a matter to be dispensed with lightly.
20
The intermediate theory, emphasizing sound judicial discretion,
is based upon a consideration of all the facts of the particular
case,21 with the primary concern being the welfare of the child.22
"144 F.9d at 65o.
1sIbid.
11"[N]o opinion of any court so far as we are aware approves the right in anyone
to take away from natural parents the custody of their children solely upon the
ground that the adopting parent is better prepared to provide superior advan-
tages to the child which the natural parent for any cause might be unable to pro-
vide. But where that situation exists, and the parent has agreed that his or her
child might be adopted and has executed such consent or offer in the manner pointed
out by the statutory regulations of the particular jurisdiction which has been acted
on by the proposed adopter, then such consent or agreement, in the absence of fraud
or duress in its procurement, plus the vastly increased opportunities of the adopted
child, creates a case where there is no alternative but to sustain the adoption aplilied
for." Lee v. Thomas, 297 Ky. 858, 181 S.W.2d 457, 460 (944).
"OEx parte Schultz, 64 Nev. 264, 181 P.2d 585, 596-97 (1947). Pertinent, however,
is the following statement by Dean Roscoe Pound in his The Spirit of the Common
Law (1921) which is quoted in In re Adoption of Morrison, 26o Wis. 50, 49 N.W.2d
759 (1951): "Courts no longer make the natural rights of the parents with respect
to children the chief basis of their decisions. The individual interest of parents
which used to be the one thing regarded has come to be almost the last thing regard-
ed as compared, with the interest of the child and the interest of society. In other
words, here also social interests are chiefly regarded." Id. at 764.
21A v. B, 217 Ark. 844, 233 S.W.2d 629 (195o); In re Adoption of Pitcher, 1o3 Cal.
App. 2d 859, 230 P.2d 449 (1951); Bailey v. Mars, 138 Conn. 593, 87 A.2d 388 (1952);
Weisbart v. Berezin, 347 Ill. App. 13, 1o5 N.E.2d 814 (1952); In re Dickholtz, 341 JII.
App. 400, 94 N.E.2d 89 (195o); In re Mayernik, 292 S.W.2d 562 (Mo. 1955); In re
Adoption of Anonymous, 286 App. Div. 161, 143 N.Y.S.2d 9o (2d Dep't 1955); In re
Adoption of Anonymous, 198 Misc. 185, lo N.Y.S.2d 93 (Del. County Ct. 195o ) .
-'Ibid. "When a child comes before the court for adoption, whether on the
basis of the desertion or consent of the natural parents filed with the court, the pres-
CASE COMMENTS
This theory is perhaps best illustrated by In re Adoption of D_---, 23
wherein the child was also illegitimate and the natural mother had
likewise given written consent. In refusing to allow the mother to re-
voke such consent, the Supreme Court of Utah said:
"Reading of many cases on this subject teaches that each de-
pends upon its own facts: the circumstances of the placement
of the child; those under which the consent was given; the
length of time the adoptive parents have had the child; any
'vested rights' that have intervened; the welfare of the child;
the conduct, as well as the character and ability of the respective
claimants; these and the particular governing statute are all
given consideration in determining whether the consent may be
revoked." 24
Other jurisdictions following this intermediate view consider simi-
lar criteria, such as the financial and physical condition of the mother,
her previous mode of life, and the losses that the adoptive parents may
be subjected to as a result of relying upon the mother's consent.25 It is
suggested that any or all of the aforementioned criteria are material
considerations for the court in determining what is in the best in-
terest of the child, the determination of which is the foundation of
the intermediate theory.2 0
It would seem that there are at least two advantages to leaving the
matter of revocation of consent to the court's discretion. Both are
pointed out by In re Adoption of Anonymous, 27 in which the court
said that "although the mother may have no right to condition her
consent on a subsequent change of mind, the Surrogate may, in the
exercise of his discretion, and on consideration of .all the circum-
stances, relieve her of her agreement and permit the consent to be
ent disposition, the status and the fact of the blood relationship of the natural par-
ents are material factors for consideration by the court. They are material in de-
termining what is for the present best interests of the child. They are not considera-
tions which void all others. The dominant and ultimate consideration is the best
interests of the child." Rhodes v. Shirley, 234 Ind. 587, 129 N.E.2d 60, 63-4 (1955). Ac-
cord, In re Holman's Adoption, 8o Ariz. 201, 295 P.2d 372 (1956); Ellis v. McCoy, 332
Mass. 254, 124 N.E.2d 266 ('955); Kalika v. Munro, 323 Mass. 536, 83 N.E.2d 172
(1948); Hammond v. Chadwick, 199 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
0122 Utah 525, 252 P.2d 223 (1953)-
-'Id. at 227.
"-In re Adoption of Anonymous, 198 Misc. 185, lot N.Y.S.2d 93 (Del. County Ct
1950).
2"It is our conclusion that the provision for revocation only by leave of court
does not destroy in toto the right of the mother to call back unto herself the sacred
relationship of parent and child. But she may not arbitrarily undo and destroy that
which she herself has permitted to be set in motion." Adoption of McKenzie, 275
S.W.2d 365, 372 (Mo. App. 1955).
0286 App. Div. 161, 143 N.Y.S.2d 90 (2d Dep't 1955).
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